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Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas:
Property Rights, Personal Rights and
The Liberal Regime
By WILLIAM V. FRAME* AND THOMAS J. SCORZA**
Introduction
With increasing frequency, local disputes over zoning ordinances
are raising divisive issues of profound constitutional importance., These
apparently simple disputes pose complex questions about such matters
as the constitutional permissibility of economic discrimination, the ex-
tent of a community's control over its environment, and the power of a
municipality to limit or even halt its own growth. At bottom, these
questions challenge American jurisprudence, for they eventually touch
the very nature of law in a liberal regime.2 In the end, exclusionary
zoning ordinances precipitate a modern version of the ancient conflict
between individual and society.
However, the contemporary jurisprudential management of this old
conflict has been surprisingly evasive, and markedly partial. On the one
hand, the primary jurisprudential question of the extent of a liberal
community's power over individual rights has been blurred by the
distinction drawn between personal and property rights and by the
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Kenyon College.
** Assistant Professor of Political Science, Kenyon College.
1. Note, for example, the intensity of the debate even on the issue of constitution-
al standing to challenge exclusionary zoning ordinances in Warth v. Seldin, 43 U.S.L.W.
4906 (U.S. June 25, 1975).
2. "Regime," as it is used in this article, means the whole complex which is a
political society - not only its constitution and laws, but the way of life followed by its
citizens and the actual distribution of power and authority which lies beneath the laws.
See L. STRAuss, NATURAL RiGHT & HISTORY 135-38 (1953). The "liberal regime" is "the
regime devoted to the principle that the purpose of government is the securing of the
equal right of every individual to pursue happiness as he understands it." T. PANGLE,
MONTEsQiEu's PamosoPmn oF LmERALisam 1 (1973). The precise implication of this
definition for the relationship between the individual and liberal society is the subject of
this article.
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corresponding claim that these fights differ in the extent to which they
are entitled to constitutional protection. This claim and its attendant
legal formulae have subsumed the basic jurisprudential question beneath
technicalities and arbitrary judicial distinctions. Secondly, when the
primary jurisprudential question has been touched, unstated philosophi-
cal premises have made it seem as if there is only one answer appropri-
ate to liberalism: the individual must prevail over the society except
when the rights of other individuals are directly threatened. Thus, the
purported distinction between rights and the oversimplification of the
character of liberalism have combined to remove from the forefront the
fundamental issue, the conflict between individual and liberal society.
An examination of the Supreme Court's decision in the zoning
case, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, will demonstrate the Courfs
reliance upon the distinction between personal and property rights. The
dissenting opinion by Justice Thurgood Marshall in the case will evi-
dence the influence of John Stuart Mill's conception of liberalism upon
constitutional thinking. Finally, the alternate conceptions of liberalism
contained in the jurisprudence of William Blackstone and John Marshall
will place contemporary constitutional adjudication in high relief and
suggest that the older liberal jurisprudence was both more profound and
more direct in its confrontation with the perennial conflict between
society and citizen.
I. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,3 the Supreme Court sustained a
zoning ordinance which restricts village land use to one-family dwellings
and defines the word "family" to mean "[o]ne or more persons related
by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single
housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants." Further, the ordi-
nance provides that "[a] number of persons but not exceeding two (2)
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not
related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a
family."4 The purpose of the ordinance is to prohibit any group of three
or more unrelated persons from residing in any of Belle Terre's one-
family dwellings. In particular, the ordinance is aimed at "communes"
of three or more unrelated students from the nearby Stony Brook
campus of the State University of New York.5
3. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
4. Id. at 2.
5. New York Times, April 2, 1974, at 1, col. 2; id. at 18, col. 1.
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The Belle Terre ordinance goes far beyond an attempt to guarantee
the residential character of the village. By restricting land use to one-
family dwellings and defining "family" so as to exclude all groups
except traditional families and unrelated couples, the ordinance amounts
to a regulation of the living arrangements within any village residential
dwelling. In effect, the ordinance grants a preference both to traditional
family units and to unrelated couples and penalizes groups of three or
more unrelated persons. In totality, the ordinance presents an instance of
a community's attempt to regulate the way of life of those who desire to
be its residents. This particular use of the prosaic zoning power thus
ultimately raises the most sublime questions concerning the relationship
of the individual to a liberal society. In the end, the issue of the Belle
Terre zoning case demands an investigation of the extent and limitations
of a liberal society's power over the individuals who authorize and
constitute that society. The issue of land use planning, no less than the
issues, for instance, of community control over obscenity or abortion,
may demand an examination of the fundamental nature of a liberal
regime. 6
The opinion of the Court in Belle Terre did not, however, proceed
from such an examination. Speaking for a majority of seven, Justice
Douglas was prepared to admit that the case brought to the Court "a
different phase of local zoning regulations" than had been previously
reviewed.7 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,8 the Court had
sustained the complex 1922 zoning ordinance of Euclid, Ohio, which
had regulated land use, building height, and lot sizes and dimensions.
There the Court had ruled against the Ambler Company's claim that the
Euclid ordinance deprived the company of liberty and property without
due process of law and denied it equal protection of the law by banning
the more profitable industrial development of portions of a sixty-eight
acre tract of company-owned land which fell within predominantly
residential use districts. Since the legislative classifications of the various
permissible land uses were "fairly debatable" but not "clearly arbitrary,"
the Court held that the regulation of land use was a proper exercise of
the police power and could comprehend the exclusion of all industrial
uses, whether or not dangerous or offensive, from certain areas.9 Fur-
ther, in Berman v. Parker,10 the Court had sustained a land use project
6. For an examination involving the obscenity issue, see H. CLoR, OBscENrry AND
PUBLIC MORALrrY (1969).
7. 416 U.S. at 3.
8. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9. Id. at 388, 395.
10. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Justice Douglas was also the author of this opinion.
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in the District of Columbia which attempted to eliminate "blighted
areas" in that urban community. The Court there refused to limit the
concept of the public welfare to health and safety, holding that the
"values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary."" Thus, prior to Belle Terre, the Court had held that munici-
palities may not only restrict land use to residential purposes but also
may aim at the "spiritual" and "aesthetic" improvement of the commu-
nity environment. Yet, however broad were the Court's interpretations
of the permissible extent of land use regulation in Euclid v. Ambler and
Berman v. Parker, neither case raised the issue of the permissibility of
using the zoning or land use powers to regulate the internal arrange-
ments of residences. Justice Douglas' admission that the Belle Terre
ordinance is "different" thus somewhat understated the case. In fact, this
understatement prepared the way for the majority to avoid the full
dimensions of the problem posed by Belle Terre.
Justice Douglas and six of his colleagues held that the Belle Terre
ordinance did not violate equal protection and the rights of association,
travel, and privacy.'" They did so by denying that the zoning ordinance
affected any 'fundamental' right" or "any rights of privacy."' 3 Hence,
Justice Douglas observed:
We deal with economic and social legislation where legislatures
have historically drawn lines which we respect against the charge
of violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the law be "reason-
able, not arbitrary" . . . and bears "a rational relationship to a
[permissible] state objective.' 14
According to Justice Douglas, then, the ordinance exists in the area in
which, under the so-called "double standard,"'I5 the Court will give wide
latitude to legislative discretion. Because according to Justice Douglas
the ordinance deals with "economic and social" matters and not with
"fundamental personal rights," the Court will respect the legislative
discretion which opens Belle Terre to families. and unrelated couples and
closes the village to groups of three or more unrelated people. Since the
regulation here is finally a regulation of property rights and not personal
rights, Justice Douglas could endorse a very expansive conception of the
11. Id. at 33. Congress' power over the District of Columbia is the equivalent of
the police power of a state. Id. at 31-32. See also District of Columbia v. Thompson Co.,
346 U.S. 100, 108 (1953).
12. 416 U.S. at 7-8.
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id. at 8.
15. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 8-28 (2d ed. 1972); P. FREUND,
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 28-91 (1961).
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police power. That power, he argued, "is not confined to elimination of
filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." 16
Unlike the "spiritual" and "aesthetic" public values spoken of in
Berman v. Parker, the "family values" cited in Belle Terre necessarily
reach into the privacy of the home and are not confined to the external
community environment. In light of this fact, it is surprising to find
Justice Douglas, who is noted for his broad civil libertarian views, not
only joining the Belle Terre majority, but, in fact, writing the expansive
majority opinion. Apparently, however, he had decided that his favorite
environmental interests should prevail over his favorite libertarian inter-
ests.17 In part, this decision by Justice Douglas was facilitated by the fact
that the Belle Terre ordinance did not evidence an "animosity to unmar-
ried couples" (two unmarried people could constitute a family), nor to
larger unrelated groups on the basis of the sexual mix of the individuals
in the groups.' 8 However, the controlling constitutional factor for Justice
Douglas was apparently his contention that the Belle Terre ordinance
was a regulation of property and not of "fundamental" rights. Thus, he
openly identified the appellees as the owners of a house in Belle Terre
who had illegally leased to a group of six unrelated students, and he
quickly passed over the fact that three of the students were also appel-
lees.' 9 Moreover, Justice Douglas returned at the end of his opinion to
the issue of property rights when he insisted that the case had not
become moot when the student appellees had moved out of their rented
house. For Douglas, there remained a case or controversy because the
issue concerned the rental value of the lessors' property, and the nature
of the right involved easily settled the question for him. Quoting Justice
Holmes, Justice Douglas asserted that the Belle Terre case could be
decided on the simple ground that "property rights may be cut down,
and to that extent taken, without pay."20
Justice Brennan dissented from the majority opinion on the ground
that it was no longer clear that a case or controversy was presented. 2' He
argued that the case, therefore, should be remanded to the district court
16. 416 U.S. at 9.
17. See Justice Douglas' nearly open advocacy of Vermont's "statewide land-use
controls." Id. at 5 n.3.
18. 416 U.S. at 8.
19. Id. at 2-3.
20. Id. at 9-10, citing Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
21. 416 U.S. at 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to determine whether or not a cognizable case or controversy in fact
continued to exist. The fact was that the tenant appellees had since
vacated the Belle Terre house, and, according to Justice Brennan,
"It]he constitutional challenge to the village ordinance is premised
solely on alleged infringement of associational and other constitutional
rights of tenants."22 Thus, whether there remained a case or controversy
turned, for Justice Brennan, on the question of "whether the lessor
appellees may attack the ordinance on the basis of the constitutional
rights of their tenants. 23 Justice Brennan's technical dissent may con-
ceal an agreement with Justice Douglas' major point, i.e., that the prop-
erty right of the lessors demands minimal protective court scrutiny. In-
deed, in noting that the brief for the appellees "negates any claim that
[the lessors] face economic loss," Justice Brennan clearly indicates that
an economic injury to the lessors would be a constitutionally impor-
tant factor only in establishing the lessor's standing to challenge the Belle
Terre ordinance on the basis of their tenants' rights.24
Justice Marshall dissented on substantive grounds and would have
held the Belle Terre ordinance unconstitutional as violative of the lessee
students' "fundamental rights of association and privacy guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 25 In the process of registering
his dissent, Justice Marshall openly stated what Justice Brennan's dissent
had implied: "Had the owners alone brought this suit alleging that the
restrictive ordinance deprived them of their property or was an irrational
legislative classification, I would agree that the ordinance would have to
be sustained. '2 6 For Justice Marshall, however, the case involved the
"fundamental personal rights"27 of the students, and thus even under a
broadly interpreted zoning power, which he himself on the whole would
defend,28 the ordinance must pass the close scrutiny of the Court. Just as
the Court did not and would not allow the use of zoning to enforce
racial segregation, it should not, argued Justice Marshall, allow a zoning
law to burden First Amendment freedoms. In particular, the Belle Terre
ordinance "unnecessarily burdens appellees' First Amendment freedom
of association and their constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy."29
The selection of living companions needs to be protected as diligently as
22. Id. (italics in the original).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 11.
25. 416 U.S. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 18.
28. Id. at 13-14, 17.
29. Id. at 15.
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one's choice of political, economic or social associates is protected, and
the selection of living companions involves a decision which "surely falls
within the ambit of the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.""0
On these grounds, Justice Marshall could conclude:
The instant ordinance discriminates on the basis of ...a
personal lifestyle choice as to household companions. It permits
any number of persons related by blood or marriage, be it two or
twenty, to live in a single household, but it limits to two the num-
ber of unrelated persons bound by profession, love, friendship, re-
ligious or political affiliation, or mere economics who can occupy
a single home. Belle Terre imposes upon those who deviate from
the community norm in their choice of living companions signifi-
cantly greater restrictions than are applied to residential groups who
are related by blood or marriage, and compose the established
order within the community. The town has, in effect, acted to
fence out those individuals whose choice of lifestyle differs from
that of its current residents. 31
One need not agree with Justice Marshall's conclusion to realize
that the Belle Terre ordinance is not limited to controlling such prob-
lems as the "density of population and the related problems of noise,
traffic, and the like."32 Indeed, the ordinance places no direct limitation
on population density since traditional families of any size may reside in
the village of Belle Terre, nor does it place a direct limitation on the
number of automobiles. Also, the ordinance does not necessarily moder-
ate rents by excluding large groups of unrelated renters, since it does not
restrict the number of wage earners in permitted households. 33 The
essence of the ordinance is its attempt to enforce the "familial character
of the community."34 While Justice Marshall apparently would accept
even this latter goal as a legitimate governmental interest, he denied that
there was any clear evidence that the familial character of Belle Terre
"would be fundamentally affected" if the village "permitted a limited
number of unrelated persons to live together" within its boundaries.3 5
According to Justice Marshall, in the absence of such clear evidence, the,
ordinance cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. It is not clear that
the burden imposed by the ordinance is "necessary to protect a com-
pelling and substantial governmental interest. '3 6 What is clear, however,
30. Id. at 16.
31. Id. at 16-17.
32. Id. at 19.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 18. Justice Marshall here construes this "compelling state interest"
requirement to mean that if it is determined that a burden has been placed upon a
"fundamental personal right," then "the onus of demonstrating that no less intrusive
means will adequately protect the compelling state interest... is upon the party seeking
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is that the ordinance "undertakes to regulate the way people choose to
associate with each other within the privacy of their own homes. '37
Justice Marshall's defense of alternative "lifestyles" against the
zoning authorities' attempt to regulate "how they choose to live ' 38
is not based on any explicit theoretical inquiry by him into the
limitations of a liberal society's control over its individual citizens.
However, the particular conception of the right to privacy contained in
Justice Marshall's dissent (and in earlier Supreme Court decisions con-
cerning privacy8 9) did receive full theoretical treatment in John Stuart
Mill's On Liberty. Mill argued that the only worthy conception of liberty
was one which entailed both an absolute individual freedom of speech
and an individual freedom of action which was limited only by a
prohibition against doing actual harm to others.40 So understood, liberty
demands a sphere of individual privacy beyond governmental or societal
control, and in al conflicts between the public and the private spheres
the burden rests upon the public sphere to prove that individual privacy
is not being violated. The essence of Mill's argument is so similar to
Justice Marshall's that the latter's dissent in Belle Terre can be viewed as
a paraphrase of the argument in On Liberty that:
[F]rom [the] liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within
the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to
unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others ....
• . .As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there
should be different opinions, so it is that there should be different
experiments of living .... 41
However appealing may be reliance upon Mill and his "one very
to justify the burden." See also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
A less rigorous version of this "compelling state interest" requirement leads to
"balancing" of community and individual interests. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-
53, 154-55, and 164-65 (1973).
Justice Marshall considers the even less rigorous "rational relation" test appropriate
only for litigating issues concerning legislative regulation of property rights. See Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
37. 416 U.S. at 17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 15.
39. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 486 (1965). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
40. J.S. MILL, ON LmERTy 16 (C. Shields ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as MILL].
However, unlike Justice Marshall, Mill grounds this liberty in "utility" rather than
"abstract right." Id. at 14.
41. Id. at 16, 68.
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simple principle" which limits liberal government to interference with
individuals only when it is necessary to prevent palpable injury to
others,'4 2 the fact is that Mill's principle is filled with theoretical difficul-
ties. In her recent study of Mill's On Liberty,43 Professor Gertrude
Himmelfarb has shown that the argument of On Liberty contradicts
other liberal arguments advanced by Mill himself, arguments in which
Mill had shown that there is no necessary inconsistency between proper
individual liberty and societal enforcement of common notions of jus-
tice, standards of right conduct, and even perimeters of right opinion."
The contemporary Court, moreover, accepts only half of the argument of
On Liberty, for Mill certainly did not propose in that work that threats
to individual property rights automatically be given less scrutiny than
threats to "personal rights."4 5
In sum, Belle Terre points to the complex theoretical question of
the relationship between individual and society in a liberal regime. This
question, however, was not treated by the Court for two related reasons.
First, the majority justices based their decision upon the claim that the
Belle Terre ordinance was finally a regulation of property, a kind of
regulation to which the courts grant a "presumption of validity."46 The
majority view thus made unnecessary any inquiry into the proper extent
of governmental control over an individual's property right: it is as-
sumed and settled that the legislature has all but carte blanche power
over private property when it is regulating within the scope of the police
power. 47
Secondly, Justice Marshall's substantive dissent is based upon the
claim that, since the Belle Terre ordinance affects "fundamental person-
al rights," its proponents have the burden of demonstrating clearly that
the ordinance is "necessary to protect a compelling and substantial
governmental interest. ' 48 However, according to the assumptions which
govern such a potential demonstration, there is an extremely narrow
area of "compelling and substantial governmental interest," and so the
42. Id. at 13.
43. G. HimiELFARB, ON LIBERTY AND LER.ALsMI (1974) [hereinafter cited as
HrMMELrAB].
44. Id. at 46-47, 77-80, 90-91, 106-08.
45. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 40, at 115-16; HIMMELFARB, supra note 43, at 109-
12.
46. See Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Carpentier, 167 F. Supp. 898, 902 (S.D. Il1.
1958).
47. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
48. 416 U.S. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting), citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969).
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burden is virtually impossible to bear. While the government has a clear
interest in preventing palpable harm to its citizens, it has no justifiable
interest in "how they choose to live."49 A governmenfs interest in the
character of its community or the specifically moral condition of its
citizenry presumably could seldom pass close constitutional scrutiny.
Thus, in the end, Justice Marshall's dissent not only does not open the
question of the relationship of the individual to the liberal regime, but it
in fact closes the question by, as it were, assuming that an adequate
answer has already been presented by one part of John Stuart Mill's
position in On Liberty.
The majority and dissenting opinions avoided a complex theoreti-
cal issue by appeals to the same sterile formula. The real issue posed by
the Belle Terre case was avoided while the justices tried to locate the
ordinance in a scheme which asserts that the decisive fact of such
constitutional adjudication is whether society attempts to regulate prop-
erty rights or personal fights. Apparently, all of the justices are willing to
accept almost any rational legislative regulation of property, but the
attempt to regulate personal rights will run into rigid and unreceptive
libertarian assumptions or "balancing" tests between "heavyweight!'
individual rights and decidedly "lightweight" societal interests. ° The
unfortunate result of this kind of adjudication is that the Court strips the
law of the defensible and convincing theoretical base which is needed
for the preservation of its standing in a liberal society.
H. Blackstone on Property Rights, Personal Rights
and Privacy
Improvement of this situation requires a rethinking of the purport-
ed dichotomy between property and personal fights and a return to a
direct confrontation with the problem of the individual's relationship to
liberal society. The contemporary Court's near-absolutizing of personal
rights and downgrading of property rights has led to decisions which are
as facile as those of an earlier Court, which made the property right
sacrosanct and which held property to be virtually beyond public con-
trol.51 The underlying issue has been ignored equally by either attempt
49. 416 U.S. at 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-
54 (1973).
50. But see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Clor, Obscenity and the First Amendment: Round Three, 7
LOYOLA L. REv. (Los ANGELES) 207 (1974).
51. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex. rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905);
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to achieve a simplistic solution to a complex and perennial problem.
When liberal society attempts to regulate either property or persons (if
the two can be perfectly distinguished), the issue raised runs to the heart
of liberalism itself and demands an understanding which is fully ade-
quate to the theoretical questions presented.
To find such an understanding in the legal tradition itself, we must
examine the formative period of modem constitutionalism-the period
when a law shaped in the struggle between king and lords was refitted to
regulate the new relationship between public power and private rights.52
William Blackstone stood in the center of this period-after the legal
profession had consolidated the resolution of the constitutional crisis of
the seventeenth century, and before the Parliament was persuaded by
the utilitarians to intervene decisively in the common law. 53 From this
vantage point, Blackstone presented at Oxford in 1753 a series of
lectures which were designed, as he wrote, to provide "an highly useful,
I had almost said essential, part of [the] liberal and polite education" of
the gentlemen and nobility of England, since such men "cannot, in any
scene of life, discharge properly their duty either to the public or
themselves, without some degree of knowledge in the laws." 54 In these
lectures, Blackstone sought to devise a rationale for the law which was
accessible to his students and which was consistent with both English
jurisprudence and the emergent liberal regime.55 The result, which
includes a guideline for protecting the rights of personal liberty and
private property as well as a conception of privacy, was presented in the
four volumes of his Commentaries on the Laws of England. The Com-
mentaries, as it turned out, were more influential in America than in
England,56 and constituted a major ingredient in the education of those
who shaped American jurisprudence to the principles of the Constitu-
tion. 57
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S.
601 (1895); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875).
52. See C. McILwAIN, CoNsmTnoNALisM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 123-46 (rev.
ed. 1947).
53. See 2 W. HoLnswoRTH, A HisTORY OF ENGLisH LAw 486 (2d ed. 1914). See
also H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY
AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 244 (F. Pollock ed. 1963).
54. 1 W. BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTARIES *6, 7 [hereinafter cited as CoMMENT&RI s].
55. See 1 id. *6, 145, where Blackstone refers to Montesquieu's The Spirit of the
Laws and finds that its theoretical description of the liberal regime is consistent with the
English constitution.
56. D. LOCKMiLLER, SIR WILiAm BLACKSTONE 169-90 (1938) [hereinafter cited as
LocEmILLER].
57. See R. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 6-7 (1968) [herein-
after cited as FAULKNER].
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Blackstone drew a distinction between personal and property
rights, but the result of his distinction is very unlike the result of the
distinction between these rights which is made by the Belle Terre Court.
Blackstone's distinction is based upon his presumption that each civil
liberty has one of two origins: either it is a part of "that residuum of
natural liberty" which survives the launching of civil society, or it is one
of "those civil privileges" which the conventional or political order itself
grants. 8 Thus, the three rights which compose essential civil liberty-
personal security, personal liberty and private property," -can each be
said to derive from either nature or convention. As it turns out, both of
the personal rights are clearly natural, while the private property right,
in its usual sense, is apparently conventional. The right of private
property consists in "that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." 60 Despite
the fact that "nothing . . . so generally strikes the imagination, and
engages the affections of mankind," 61 the right is not only secured by
means available only in civil society, but private property itself, at least
in its familiar forms, exists only in civil society:
[T]here is no foundation in nature or in natural law, why a set of
words upon parchment should convey the dominion of land; why
the son should have a right to exclude his fellow creatures from a
determinate spot of ground, because his father had done so before
him: or why the occupier of a particular field or of a jewel, when
lying on his death-bed and no longer able to maintain possession,
should be entitled to tell the rest of the world which of them should
enjoy it after him.12
Yet Blackstone does not conclude from this fact that the property right
is inferior to the natural personal rights. Indeed, taken together, all three
rights remain "absolute" or fundamental, for:
as there is no other known method of compulsion, or of abridging
man's natural free will, but by an infringement or diminution of
one or other of these important rights, the preservation of these,
inviolate, may justly be said to include the preservation of our civilimmunities in their largest and most extensive sense.63
58. 1 COMMENTARES *129.
59. Id.
60. 2 id. *2.
61. Id.
62. Id. Blackstone's remarks here suggest the reason for his earlier qualified
statement that the "original of private property is probably founded in nature." 1 id.
*138.
63. 1 id. *129. The chapter in which Blackstone discusses the three rights is
entitled, "Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals." 1 id. *121.
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There are a variety of reasons why the conventional status of the
property right does not lower its importance in relation to the natural
personal rights of security and liberty. In the first place, it is not even
generally true that the conventional order is simply inferior to the
natural order. Thus, while natural liberty is "a right inherent in us by
birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when he
endued him with the faculty of free-will,"'6 4 Blackstone nevertheless
considers the part of this natural liberty jettisoned for the sake of civil
society as well lost, for the "species of legal obedience and conformity"
available in any ordered regime, including even tyranny, "is infinitely
more desirable than that wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed to
obtain it."65 Indeed, the expenditure of part of natural liberty has
purchased, in the case of England, "[a] land, perhaps the only one in
the universe, in which political or civil liberty is the very end and scope
of the constitution."6' 6 Thus, the fact that the right to private property is
rooted in the ordered regime rather than in nature does not in itself
diminish the right in any way. Indeed, the ordered regime is more
desirable than the savage part of the natural order, and perhaps it even
is more desirable than the whole natural order, of which the savage
portion seems to be a necessary part.
More positively, the conventional order may involve a justice which
is in fact superior to natural justice. Thus, while discussing the right of
personal security-a right which obliges public protection of life, limbs,
body, health, and reputation 6 ---Blackstone warns against the easy sup-
position that civil society will tolerate the securing of even such a natural
right by natural rather than conventional or civil means. For example,
the right to act in self-defense is properly restricted in civil society.
Although it is "justly called the primary law of nature,"
We must not carry this doctrine to the same visionary length that
Mr. Locke does: who holds "that all manner of force without right
upon a man's person, puts him in a state of war with the aggressor;
and, of consequence, that, being in such a state of war, he may law-
fully kill him that puts him under this unnatural restraint." How-
ever just this conclusion may be in a state of uncivilized nature,
yet the law of England, like that of every other well-regulated
community, is too tender of the public peace, too careful of the
lives of the subjects, to adopt so contentious a system; nor will
suffer with impunity any crime to be prevented by death, unless
the same, if committed, would also be punished by death.68
64. 1 id. *125.
65. Id.
66. lid. *6.
67. See I id. *129-34. See also 4 id. *176-219.
68. 3 id. *4; 4 id. *181-82 (emphasis in the original).
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Further, the natural may depend upon the conventional for its very
existence. Hence, the right of personal liberty-which, like the right of
personal security is a "right strictly natural 6 9 -is secured almost
exclusively by the civil writ of habeas corpus, "that second magna carta,
and stable bulwark of our liberties. ' 70 Only the patronage of civil
society, in the form of the writ, provides an instrument for the protection
of the natural right of personal liberty. Thus, not only may various civil
conventions improve upon nature, but they may also allow the only
means whereby the natural may survive. Again, the apparently conven-
tional character of the private property right does not indicate its inferior-
ity to the clearly natural personal rights of security and liberty.
Finally, the right to property leads directly to many public benefits.
Unlike Locke, Blackstone does not celebrate private property as the
chief provision of civil society and as the focus of man's natural passion
for acquisition. 1 Neither does Blackstone celebrate property as the
platform and opportunity for individual self-expression. 2 However, he
regards a settled law protecting private property to be a necessary
condition of civil peace,78 and civil peace as the first condition of civil
liberty.74 Moreover, Blackstone points out that the security of private
property brings to civil life still other benefits. Inheritance, for example,
"has an evident tendency to make a man a good citizen and a useful
member of society: it sets the passions on the side of duty, and prompts
a man to deserve well of the public, when he is sure that the reward of
his services will not die with himself, but be transmitted to those with
whom he is connected by the dearest and most tender affections." 75
The proper performance of the duties, both, civic and filial, which
property ownership incurs requires a "liberal and polite education"
which Blackstone supposes strengthens the commitment to liberty
among the wealthy.7 6 Finally, commerce contributes to the "universal
69. 1 id. *134.
70. 1 id. *137.
71. See, e.g., J. LocKE, Two TREATIsEs OF GOVERNMENT 339-40 (P. Laslett ed.
1967), where Locke argues that "the increase of lands and the right imploying of them is
the great art of government." See also 2 J. LocKE, AN EssAY CONCERNING HumAN
UNDERSTANDiNoG 208 (A. Fraser ed. 1959), in which Locke says that "where there is no
property there is no injustice."
72. John Marshall supported this rationale of the property right because he was a
much greater friend of "acquisitive individualism" than Blackstone. See infra, section m.
73. See 2 CoMMENTARIEs, supra note 54, at *10, where Blackstone argues that
civilization requires an established law of inheritance to avoid "endless disturbances"
over the property of the deceased.
74. See l id. *47-48.
75. 2 id. *11.
76. 1 id. *6-13.
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good of the nation. 77 These incidentals thus combine with the earlier
points to suggest that the "sole and despotic dominion" of the property
owner performs a broad public service. The protection of this conven-
tional private right guarantees public peace and civil liberty, contributes
to national prosperity, and cultivates at least a modicum of patriotism.
78
There are no grounds for supposing that the property right requires, as a
matter of principle, less protection than personal rights.
Of course, the theoretical importance of these equally fundamental
individual rights to the edifice of liberty does not guarantee their protec-
tion.7 9 The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, rather than constitu-
tional supremacy, meant that English liberties could not be secured by a
technical jurisprudence.80 The real purpose of the lectures at Oxford was
to make partisans of English liberty out of prospective legislators. To
complete the task, Blackstone propounded a test which the Parliament
might use to determine the propriety of legislation. He proposed that
there are two kinds of activities which the law ought not to touch: those
which are performed in private without witness, and those which neither
advance nor injure the "common utility.$81
The private activities that tempt legislatures to apply legal restraint
are those which are considered base or wicked. But the temptation ought
to be resisted where the activity is performed alone, because an action
performed without witnesses cannot be adjudged in a proper English
tribunal, and so a law touching such matters cannot be enforced by legal
sanction. But if the action is witnessed, to say nothing of causing direct
harm, it obliges legislative attention:
For the end and intent of [municipal] laws being only to regulate the
behavior of mankind, as they are members of society, and stand
in various relations to each other, they have consequently no
concern with any other but social or relative duties. Let a
man therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vicious
in his practice, provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and
does not offend against the rules of public decency, he is out of -the
reach of human laws. But if he makes his vices public, though
77. lid. *126.
78. See 1 id. *6-11. This argument does not easily apply to the United States where
property, from the beginning, meant commercial commodity rather than inheritance. See
Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American Law, 1780-
1860, 40 U. Cm. L. Rav. 248 (1973).
79. See 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 54, at *5-8, 36-37, where Blackstone points
out the need for educating potential legislators and jurors about these individual rights.
80. See 1 id. *31-33. Here Blackstone condemns that form of legal knowledge
which is gained by apprenticeship "at the desk of some skillful attorney, land which is
designed] to initiate [the apprentices] early in all the depths of practice, and render them
more dexterous in the mechanical part of the business." 1 id. *32.
81. 1 id. *126.
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they be such as seem principally to affect himself (as drunken-
ness, or the like,) they then become, by the bad example they set,
of pernicious effects to society; and therefore it is then the busi-
ness of human laws to correct them. Here the circumstance of
publication is what alters the nature of the case. Public sobriety is
a relative duty, and therefore enjoined by our laws; private so-
briety is an absolute duty, which, whether it be performed or not,
human tribunals can never know; and therefore they can never
enforce it by any civil sanction.8 2
This ground is not Mill's ground in On Liberty. Blackstone's test is
simply consistent with the capacities of English courts for adjudication.
Although it distinguishes the illegal from the wrong, it does not divorce
them. 3 For Blackstone, a wrong action untouched by law remains
wrong. Neither does his test widen the definition of "private" to include
self-affecting actions by more than one person, and so it does not excuse
them from legal cognizance because they are "victimless. ' 4
The definition of privacy implicit here is very narrow, and consid-
eration of the second half of Blackstone's legislation test indicates that his
definition of the public interest is correspondingly broad. The exhorta-
tion against legal treatment of actions that neither advance nor prejudice
the "common utility" indicates that few actions contemplated by the
legislature would be censured by this test:
[T~he statute of King Edward IV, which forbad the fine gentle-
men of those times (under the degree of a lord) to wear pikes
on their shoes or boots of more than two inches in length,
was a law that savoured of oppression; because, however ridicu-
lous the fashion then in use might appear, the restraining it by
pecuniary penalties could serve no purpose of common utility.
But the statute of King Charles II, which prescribes a thing seem-
ingly as indifferent, (a dress for the dead, who are all ordered to be
buried in woolen) is a law consistent with public liberty; for it
encourages the staple trade, on which in great measure depends the
universal good of the nation.88
This indicates how far the early conception of privacy is from that
82. lid. *124 (emphasis in the original).
83. Mill does not condemn private "wrongs." See MILL, supra note 40, at 99-100:
"No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman
should be punished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definite
damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is
taken out of the province of liberty and placed in that of morality or law." Note that
"morality" here is defined by the law, the jurisdiction of which is limited to actions
palpably injurious to others or which threaten palpable injury to others.
84. But cf. Mill's statement, id. at 16-17: "The only freedom which deserves the
name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to
deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian
of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual." (emphasis in the original).
85. 1 COMMENTARiES, supra note 54, at * 126.
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held by the present Court. Blackstone supposed that private behavior, as
well as private welfare, is a legitimate concern of government in a liberal
society, and privacy as a realm isolated from the public jurisdiction by
an arsenal of private rights was unknown to him. Lifestyle was as much
a subject of legitimate legislative investigation as property use-or as
little. Indeed, the greatest threat to the liberal regime in Blackstone's
estimation is the tendency among its friends to suppose that it has only
one enemy. 6 In fact, the regime can be destroyed both by a romantic
nostalgia for natural liberty and by too great a fear of natural liberty. Its
legislators must try to keep a middle ground between anarchy and
tyranny:
[W]e may collect that the law, which restrains a man from doing
mischief to his fellow-citizens, though it diminishes the natural,
increases the civil liberty of mankind; but that every wanton and
causeless restraint of the will of the subject, whether practised by a
monarch, a nobility, or a popular assembly, is a degree of tyranny:
nay, that even laws themselves, whether made with or without our
consent, if they regulate and constrain our conduct in matters of
mere indifference, without any good end in view, are regulations
destructive of liberty: whereas, if any public advantage can arise
from observing such precepts, the control of our private inclinations,
in one or two particular points, will conduce -to preserve our gen-
eral freedom in others of more importance; by supporting that
state of society, which alone can secure our independence.87
Blackstone's influence on the American jurisprudence formed to
support the Constitution was immense. John Marshall and Joseph Story
seem to quote or cite him at every turn on both substantive and
prudential matters.88 But the Americans were compelled to stray from
his advice on account of certain innovations in liberalism accomplished
by the American founding. This straying established a conception of
privacy different from Blackstone's, but it did not found a distinction
between the iights of person and property resembling that advocated by
the present Court, nor did it lead to a conception of privacy identical to
Mill's in On Liberty.
1. John Marshall: Property, Privacy and
the Public Good
At the center of the realm of privacy conceived in the jurisprudence
86. See 1 id. at *144-45, where Blackstone indicates that liberty is endangered both
by "licentiousness" and by "submission."
87. 1 id. at *125-26.
88. LOCK MLLER, supra note 56, at 171; J. MARSHALL, AN AuTOuIOnAPmcAL
SKETCH 5 (1937) [hereinafter cited as MARSHALL]. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-64 (1803); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrT-
TION OF THE UNrrED STATES 559-60 (5th Ed. 1891) (hereinafter cited as STORY].
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of John Marshall lie Blackstone's three fundamental rights. But Mar-
shall asserted a greater equality among them than had his English
mentor. He identified them each unequivocally as of natural origin and
gave them all the high status of natural rights.8" Unlike Jefferson,
Marshall did not take nature to be a beneficent and homogenous
propensity, immanent in men, which would move them to nobility when
liberated by democracy and conditioned by economic self-reliance. 90 He
recognized natural rights as expressions of ineradicable human tenden-
cies toward individualism which no conventional order could negate.
"Those who know human nature, black as it is, must know that man-
kind are . . . attached to their interest . ..."91 The stability of civil
society could be better assured by recognizing natural rights (and
thereby limiting the scope of government) than by seeking to embarass
self-interest as a motive for action. But Marshall knew that the kind of
self-interest liberated by the republican order in America could not be
relied upon to secure the regime itself. That required the patronage of
statesmanship, the motive of duty, and the art of rhetoric.9" Marshall's
efforts in behalf of these qualities can be seen, paradoxically, in his
defense of the natural rights of life, liberty and property.
Of the three rights, private property seemed to receive the most
systematic attention from Marshall. He did not disparage the rights of
personal security and personal liberty by this emphasis. Far from it. His
attitude toward them has been described recently as "thoroughly mod-
ern, 3 especially his celebration of the writ of habeas corpus,94 and his
insistence that the prosecution be held to high standards of proof and
procedure in criminal cases. 95 But the property right occupies a special
place in Marshall's jurisprudence. For him, it was primus inter pares of
the liberties secured by the founding of the commercial republic in
America. It was the highest of the natural rights whose recognition
circumscribed that founding, and upon its protection depended the
safety of the rights of person.96
89. FAULKNER, supra note 57, at 13-20.
90. See, e.g., 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 126-34 (J. Boyd ed. 1950), in
which Jefferson argues that the "great principles of right and wrong" are so obvious that
the "whole art of government consists in the art of being honest." This view calls for a
system of political and economic freedom which would require only the necessary
minimum of government.
91. 3 ELLIo's DEBATES 562 (J. Elliot ed. 1836).
92. See FAULKNER, supra note 57, at 114-92.
93. Id. at 14.
94. See, e.g., ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94-95 (1807).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
96. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 134-35 (1810); 2 STORY, supra
note 88, at 568-70.
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Marshall supposed that the property right involves at heart the
protection of contract. This doctrine of "vested rights" reflects Mar-
shall's interest in identifying the natural right of property as a right of
acquisition, rather than merely as a right to secure possession of occu-
pied land or articles. The desire to acquire property is itself the natural
form of the right, and the obligation of contract "results from the right
which every man retains to acquire property, to dispose of that property
according to his own judgment, and to pledge himself for a future act.
These rights are not given by society, but are brought into it."9
Marshall did not smuggle this view into constitutional interpreta-
tion. He regularly cited the Federalist Papers and the Constitution itself
to prove the centrality of the property right in the American regime."
But his jurisprudence does include an original effort to work out a view
of the right that would reconcile private ambition and desire with the
public interest. It is by considering this effort at reconciliation that we
come closest to finding in Marshall's jurisprudence a general rule for
guiding public interference with private rights.
In the widest political sense, Marshall believed that the recognition
and enforcement of the property right in a commercial regime paradoxi-
cally answered the problem of republican government. The liberation of
interest, and the arming of individuals with private rights, narrowed the
jurisdiction of government in the American regime. But it did not
diminish the need for legitimate social authority or public power. Pre-
cisely because interest is liberated in the American version of the liberal
regime and is authorized as the guide of human actions, some means
must be found in the regime to moderate passion and harmonize inter-
ests to prevent the anarchy which annihilates law, and hence liberty.99
It is true that passion may be moderated by education and har-
nessed to public ends by religion. But Marshall censured the "frenzy"
and "destructive rage" which religious fervor had produced occasionally
among the Puritans, 100 and praised instead the "solid safety and real
security" enjoyed by Americans under the Constitution. 0 1 The first
condition of that "solid safety and real security" was law, but the
97. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 346 (1827) (Marshall, CJ.,
dissenting).
98. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418-19 (1821); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433-35 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 135-37 (1810).
99. See FAULKNER, supra note 57, at 137-47.
100. See id. at 10.
101. See id. at 13.
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maintenance of its authority in a regime which had liberated interest
seemed to Marshall necessarily to require statesmanship, an art which
was motivated by duty rather than interest, and guided by prudence
rather than partisan passion. Marshall supposed that statesmen would
appear very infrequently in the American regime, and he offered his
Life of Washington as a rhetorical example that would partially fill this
predicted void.'0 2
But Marshall reserved a greater part of his concern for civic
education to sponsor and advertise tracts that praised and explained the
law of the American Constitution. He wrote to Story, of the Commen-
taries, "I have finished reading your great work, and wish it could be
read by every statesman, and every would-be statesman in the United
States." 0 3 In the same letter, he pointed to lawyers and judges as the
critical audience for an education that went beyond the sheer mechanics
of the law:
The vast influence which the members of the profession exer-
cise in all popular governments, especially in ours, is perceived
by all, and whatever tends to their improvement benefits the na-
tion.'04
Marshall's interest in civic education was an attempt to blunt and
transform the incipient tendency toward radical democracy in America.
On the ground that republican government was one "of laws, and not of
men,' 0 5 and that it was the very antithesis of that regime which the
Jacobins had brought to power in France, 0 6 Marshall accepted for the
judiciary the responsibility of vitalizing the principles of the American
order. The American order had faced in a new way the primary problem
of liberalism-the maintenance of the authority of that law which must
manage the tension-ridden relationship between government and citizen,
society and individual. Beginning without crown and aristocracy, and
hence without parliament, Marshall supposed that America had made
law itself the defender of liberty and, simultaneously, the definer of
public power.117 Maintaining authority for a law occupying such pivotal
102. Late in his life, he even undertook personally to edit and condense the work for
use in the public schools. Id. at 146. See generally 2 J. MARsHALL, THE LiFE OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 500-03, 518-19, 527-32 (1930), where Marshall rhetorically transforms
Washington into a model for aspiring politicians.
103. Quoted in FAULKNER, supra note 57, at 143-44.
104. Quoted id. at 143.
105. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
106. See FAULKNER, supra note 57 at 3, 10, 156, 169; cf. MARSHALL, supra note 88,
at 13-15.
107. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 413-23 (1821);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-06 (1819); Ex parte Bollman, 8
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ground seemed to require a political foothold, and might have more
easily been accomplished by Congress. But the disposition of the repub-
lic toward a less liberal democracy meant that jurisprudence, not legisla-
tive science, was to be the American bond of liberty and of order."0 8
The judicial recognition and enforcement of the property right
provided a means of bearing this critical responsibility. Commercial
affairs absorbed the greatest share of the energy and attention of Ameri-
can citizens. A jurisprudence that was disposed to protect the property
right, and which recognized that it was the lynchpin of American
liberty, would regularly touch public attention in the effort to reconcile
private action with the requirements of the public order. 0 9 The power
to touch commercial relations with authority "comes home to every man,
touches the interest of all, and controls the conduct of every individual
in those things which he supposes to be proper for his own exclusive
management.. . ."10 The new Constitution was meant to restrain the
political use of that power and obliged the judiciary to a special concern
for precisely this matter. A jurisprudence guided by this obligation
would, at least, invalidate those actions inconsistent with the social order
which gave rise to them,"' and, by means of the doctrine of implied
powers, validate those actions consistent with constitutional purposes." 2
While the Court of the late nineteenth century intervened on behalf of
property rights in order to erect a barrier between the private and public
spheres," 3 Marshall's Court intervened on behalf of property to inject
the public interest into the private sphere." 4 Marshall's intentions were
to extend rather than to contract the conception of the public interest,
and to moderate rather than to emancipate completely private interest.
He derived these intentions from the regime and its founding, but he
contrived and developed the instrument of this ruling in his jurispru-
dence.
U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125 (1807); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163,
176-80 (1803). See also 2 SToRY, supra note 88, at 568-70.
108. See the argument for judicial supremacy in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).
109. See FAuLKNER, supra note 57, at 219-30.
110. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354-55 (1827) (Marshall, CJ.,
dissenting).
111. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-63 (1832); Johnson &
Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588-92 (1823).
112. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 341-42, 349 (1827) (Marshall,
C.J., dissenting); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 412-25 (1819).
113. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Loan
Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874); cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1876).
114. See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
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Hence, the real service of such a jurisprudence is rendered by its
ability to communicate those principles of republican government and
liberty to public opinion. Marshall's opinions carefully reproduce the
ground by which the conclusion was reached, to "preserve unbroken"
the "chain of principles" which constituted the argument. 115 This was
the critical statesmanlike function of jurisprudence for Marshall. Natural
liberty was the source of the chief limitations upon the jurisdiction of the
government in the American regime, and the preservation of liberty was
the chief object of that government. The preservation of liberty required,
at the very least, the preservation of the constitutional order. That meant
restraining the chief natural passion-avarice-by educating and super-
vising commercial relations.
Marshall's understanding of the character of the liberal regime, and
the central problem of legal authority, is the source of his jurisprudence.
He derived that understanding from the same sources to which the
founders turned-Locke, Montesquieu, Blackstone-and he authorized
his interpretation of the Constitution for judicial purposes by reference
to the Federalist Papers."6 This understanding of the liberal regime did
not divorce private from public, or the rights of person from those of
property. Indeed, it was the complicated relationship between private
and public, individual and society, that challenged the ingenuity and
tested the statesmanship of Marshall, as Marshall supposed it had tested
the statesmanship of Washington." 7 In all, he recognized that the
liberation of private interest, protected by civil liberty, narrowed the
jurisdiction of government, but did not diminish the need for legitimate
public authority. The substitution of private interest for public direction
as the guide for individual behavior did not signify the sacrifice of
concern for the public good. Law, as the safeguard of liberty, needed
authority against the forces of tyranny. Law, as the conciliator of private
interest with public order and the public good, needed authority against
the propensity of desire.
IV. Conclusion
There is a profound difference between the jurisprudence of Black-
115. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 186, 222 (1824).
116. See 2 MARSHALL, supra note 102, at 148-50. (See also note 98 supra.)
117. 2, id. at 530: "In speculation, he was a real republican, devoted to the
constitution of his country, and to that system of equal political rights on which it is
founded. But between a balanced republic and a democracy, the difference is like that
between order and chaos. Real liberty, he thought, was to be preserved, only by
preserving the authority of the laws, and maintaining the energy of government. Scarcely
did society present two characters which, in his opinion, less resembled each other, than
a patriot and a demagogue."
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stone or John Marshall, on the one hand, and the jurisprudence articu-
lated "and implied in the Belle Terre opinions. The jurisprudence of
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Thurgood Marshall seems to have been
derived largely from the liberalism of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty.
That liberalism drives a wedge between the individual and society, and
on the basis of one "very simple principle" proposes to manage the very
complicated matter of individual-social relations in the liberal regime.
The difference between the present Court and Mill is that the Court has
driven a wedge through the realm of privacy itself, and simply removed
property to the area of permissible governmental regulation. Beyond
this, however, neither the Court nor Mill seems willing to regulate
anything simply for the sake of the moral character of the communi-
ty.
1 1 8
In contrast, the jurisprudence of classical liberalism, as formulated
by Blackstone or John Marshall, recognized and accepted the difference
between the public and the private in the liberal regime. But although
classical liberalism argued that the jurisdiction of the law should be
narrowed, it did not abandon the notion that public morality or the
public interest governs private interest. For neither Blackstone nor John
Marshall did the law protect an entire realm of privacy cut off from
public scrutiny or governmental concern.
Both Blackstone and John Marshall were apparently preoccupied
with the right of private property. However, a close examination of this
preoccupation cannot uncover a generic separation of the rights of
person from those of property. For Blackstone, a settled law of private
property was a condition of civil peace neither more nor less crucial than
either personal security or personal liberty, and property itself, support-
ed by a legal tradition that respected inheritance, encouraged the per-
formance of civil duty. For John Marshall, property was the key natural
right, and he supposed that individual self-interest molded by the
attraction of acquiring it would be largely reconciled to the public
interest by the dynamics of the commercial regime itself and by a
jurisprudence attuned to the principles of that regime.
The separation of property from person as an integral aspect of
private rights, and the relocation of property in the sphere of permissible
public regulation, seems to have been an indispensable condition for
driving a wedge between public and private. Property is not only
secured by civil society, but human energy in its behalf is essentially
118. Compare Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, 15 (Marshall, I., dissenting) with
Mu, supra note 40, at 13, 17 on the issue of the individual's right to choose how to live.
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social. Only when the conception of privacy is narrowed by the removal
of property from the sphere of privacy can one contrive an absolute
defense of privacy. The persuasion of an earlier Court that property was
absolutely private and beyond legitimate public cognizance could not
and did not stand the test of experience, especially in the industrial
order. But the rejection of that persuasion was accomplished by a
reversal rather than a correction, a reversal which produced the other
extreme. This reversal was guided by the same conviction-that liberal-
ism divorces private from public and denies to those who act in the
name of the regime the right to interfere in the realm of privacy or to
mold private interest to the public good.
At base, the liberal regime is distinguished by the substitution of
private self-interest for public direction as the moving principle of the
order. This requires the creation of a certain realm of privacy furnished
by civil liberties. 119 Although John Marshall's jurisprudence, following
the opinion which prevailed at Philadelphia, reflects a deeper commit-
ment to the civilizing power of commercial society itself on private
interest than does Blackstone's, neither he nor any other of the influen-
tial founders supposed that this function could be adequately performed
without governance. 2 0 Again, although the sacrifice of public direction
for the inspiration of self-interest shrank the jurisdiction of government,
it required the enlargement of public powers in what remained. This
meant that the major responsibility for governance in the liberal regime
fell upon law, for the constitutional limitations on government and
harmful private action-which together constituted the primary dangers
to liberty-meant to Blackstone and John Marshall that the only civil
authority capable of touching the jurisdictions of both private and public
is constitutional law. The dearest possession of that law, without which
it would be prostrated by either tyranny or private passion, is its
authority. Blackstone's Commentaries and John Marshall's opinions
119. As an indication of the narrow confines of the realm of privacy in the thought
of the American founders, it should be noted that the founders did not admit even
freedom of speech and press into the decisively private realm which was beyond public
control. See generally L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
rN EARLY AmEmCAN HisroRy (1960). The one apparent exception to this fact was James
Madison, who came to regard the First Amendment as an absolute guarantee of freedom
of political 'speech against federal government abridgment. Id. at 273-78. Yet even this
Madisonian libertarianism, which the present authors would support, contains a concep-
tion of privacy which is emphatically more narrow than the autonomism of Mill's On
Liberty.
120. See THE FEDmRuLisT No. 10 at 131 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison): "The
regulation of the various and interfering [property] interests forms the principal task of
modem legislation. . . ." (emphasis added).
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were meant to contribute both to the cultivation of the law's authority
among its practitioners and to the broad popular dissemination of the
wisdom of constitutional law. Both men meant to mold public senti-
ment and shape professional opinion. And both men advocated a juris-
prudence which did not abdicate its responsibility for the governance of
men.
We can conclude that supporters of this older jurisprudence would
not respond to the Belle Terre case by appeals either to the supposed
distinction between property and "fundamental" rights, or to the exist-
ence of an individual "right to privacy" beyond societal regulation.
Indeed, the older constitutional jurisprudence would reject both appeals
precisely because they involve merely legalistic formulae which are, in
fact, extra-constitutional. 12 1 For a jurisprudence grounded in the Consti-
tution, the Belle Terre ordinance would be regarded as a permissible
regulation of both property and persons, a regulation which, within a
limited area, attempts to govern the "quality of life"' 22 or public morality
of a liberal community. Stated negatively, the United States Constitution
simply does not require that legislatures abandon the tasks of govern-
ment at the threshold of a "right to privacy" which is vigorously advanced
but constitutionally ill-founded. Stated positively, liberal legislatures have
the power to regulate both property and persons according to the
values 23 defined by the public interest, except where there are specif-
ic constitutional checks on the exercise of such legislative power. The
Constitution and its principles are the only acceptable guides for both
legislation and jurisprudence, and they alone provide the lines within
which both legislative and judicial prudence must operate.
121. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 660-62 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508-10 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
122. For a case holding that the interest of the public in the quality of life is a
legitimate subject for state regulation, see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
58 (1973).
123. See, e.g., Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954). Compare Justice Douglas' support of societal values in these
environment cases with his defense of individual values in the personal matter of
abortion in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).

